Bringing America's Multilateral Diplomacy into the 21st Century



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In his February 4, 2021, address to the U.S. Department of State, President Joseph R. Biden declared "diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy."[1] The President called on the Department of State to meet accelerating global challenges, from the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear proliferation, by working in common with other nations. He spoke of global diplomacy, and global power, as America's inexhaustible source of strength and its abiding advantage.

Many perceive that advantage has eroded over the years. Today, the Department of State has a singular opportunity to lead an interagency collaboration to restore that advantage, with the support of the Administration and other interested agencies. To achieve this, the State Department cannot exclusively rely on its traditional model of bilateral diplomacy; multilateral diplomacy must become a greater focus of the Department's efforts. To effectively address the global challenges the President discussed, the Department must exert equal effort in its multilateral and bilateral diplomacy.

Although the U.S. remains virtually unmatched in its economic and social influence and power, the gap between it and the competition is narrowing. It is no longer true (if it ever was) that the U.S. does not need a global range of partners to address global crises. China is rapidly extending its presence and influence in international organizations, including international financial institutions, as are other countries, such as Russia and India. The U.S. must build strong and enduring partnerships with countries beyond its traditional alliances, particularly in Latin America and Africa. As political dynamics and world powers shifted, the U.S. response was often to disengage from multilateral diplomacy. Yet, disengagement did not lead to resolution. We must set aside the notion that international organizations excessively constrain or disproportionately burden the United States. To manage the global issues we face today and for the foreseeable future, we need to work with a global coalition of partners, even when not all of them agree with the United States all the time.

There are two challenges for the State Department

The Department must ensure that the U.S. role and presence in international organizations reflect its greatest national interests. This will require the Department to take a more active role in identifying organizations that have the greatest influence or impact on U.S. interests and in placing highly qualified candidates within those organizations. To borrow a phrase from Lin-Manuel Miranda's *Hamilton: An American Musical*, we need to "be in the room where it happens," rather than waiting to react to policies made in our absence.

The Department must develop a strong cadre of multilateral diplomats adept and experienced in leading diverse teams of experts through complex multilateral negotiations to safeguard U.S. interests and achieve positive outcomes.

In considering how to meet these challenges, it is useful to examine how other countries have maximized their multilateral influence. Smaller nations often see international organizations as the most effective way to leverage their influence. The Nordic countries are an oft-cited example of the smart application of multilateral diplomacy, but the U.K., France, Japan, and Germany also give considerable weight and attention to multilateral diplomacy, with highly effective results.

STATE DEPARTMENT PHOTO

G7 Foreign and Development Ministers Session with Guest Countries and ASEAN Nations, in Liverpool, United Kingdom, on December 12, 2021.

These successful practitioners of multilateral diplomacy have several practices and approaches in common. Their diplomats' entry-level training includes serious emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and negotiation; their career paths often involve multiple assignments to or within international organizations; and their foreign ministries are actively engaged in recruitment and advocacy for placement in international bodies of highly qualified applicants at all levels, from interns to senior executives. Other characteristics they share that the U.S. cannot easily adopt are greater ease of movement between their Civil and Foreign Services and the absence of an "up or out" promotion system. Both sets of characteristics enhance those countries' flexibility to second personnel to international organizations, and the latter somewhat offsets the nearly universal perception that secondments are not helpful to one's career.

Effective multilateral diplomacy is essential for the U.S. to achieve its foreign policy objectives and effective bilateral engagement is arguably the most critical element of successful multilateral diplomacy. U.S. diplomats must set the standard, not just throughout the U.S. government, but worldwide, for effective multilateral diplomacy. Our recommendations to achieve this fall into three categories: policy, practice, and preparation.

Policy Recommendations

1. The State Department and the Administration must make strategic decisions about where U.S. long-term multilateral interests lie and must fully engage in efforts to ensure that the U.S. has the right people in the right places to advocate for U.S. interests and to shape international policy accordingly.
2. Concurrently, the State Department must build strong relationships with a wider-than-ever range of government agencies and organizations to reassert Department leadership in foreign affairs in the interagency process.
3. Finally, the President's letter of instruction to ambassadors should stress the importance of bilateral ambassadors as an essential part of the Administration's multilateral team, and the Secretary of State should take steps to reinforce that message.

Practice Recommendations

1. The State Department should undertake a global staffing review and align human capital and policy priorities. The Department should take steps to counter the real or perceived impact of loss of promotion competitiveness resulting from assignment outside the Department by ensuring that those on detail or secondment to an international organization have an appropriately senior State Department official prepare their annual evaluations, and by linking assignments outside the Department to onward assignments that will bring new knowledge and skills back to the organization. Promotion precepts should acknowledge the complexity and impact of multilateral experience.

2. The Department should enhance its recruitment of candidates with skills and background in the environment, sciences, technology, and health (ESTH), and should transition its excellent website *International Organization Careers* (https://iocareers.state.gov) from a passive information source to an active recruitment tool.

3. The Department should identify positions in multilateral missions that could be filled by Civil Service employees and advertise them accordingly, and consider developing a pilot program for exchanges or details between State and other U.S. government agencies, including agencies with newly global portfolios.

Preparation Recommendations

1. The Department should expand entry-level training to add components on global issues and negotiating skills. Multilateral diplomacy should be included as an area of focus for all mid-level and senior training.
2. Employees at any level going to a multilateral mission for the first time should receive appropriate training already in existence at the Foreign Service Institute, and chief of mission nominees to multilateral missions should receive additional, specific training in multilateral diplomacy and multilateral negotiations.

By undertaking these and other steps that the Secretary of State may identify, the Department would be better positioned to prepare its diplomats, both Foreign Service and Civil Service, to be diplomats for tomorrow, not for yesterday.

NATO PHOTO/ PUBLIC DOMAIN

Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman meets with the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels, Belgium, on January 12, 2022.

EXAMINING THE PRESENT

What worked for U.S. foreign policy in the post-war 20th century will not work nearly as well in the remaining decades of the 21st century. The U.S. remains the most significant global actor, but other states, particularly China, have enhanced their sources of national power and expanded their global influence. Meanwhile, technology is driving the global economy and making new weapons of coercion and war available to more nations. The U.S. no longer dominates technological innovation, although it remains first among equals. And the natural world is no longer part of the background but is signaling through pandemics and climate change that it, not nations, may be the most disruptive force to the international order in the 21st century, and beyond.

The changing geopolitical, technological, and natural world will present sustained challenges to U.S. national security as well as to the wellbeing and prosperity of the American people. Some of these challenges will be familiar ones, such as dealing with China as a competitive great power, but others will be novel and perhaps truly existential threats, such as the cascading impacts of climate change. Few of these challenges will be responsive to a military solution, but will require sustained, innovative, and skilled U.S. diplomacy; diplomacy that anticipates challenges, marshals international support for U.S. positions, and builds collaborative relationships and agreements to produce outcomes consistent with U.S. interests and values.

Achieving this high standard of diplomacy will require the U.S. to strengthen its diplomatic capacity, which has been undervalued and under-resourced for years. The State Department has traditionally prioritized bilateral diplomacy, the diplomacy of nation-to-nation relations, over multilateral diplomacy. To be effective in meeting its national security goals in the coming decades, however, the State Department must bring multilateral diplomacy into the mainstream of policymaking, diplomatic practice, and diplomatic training. It must develop strategies for both global and bilateral issues that integrate multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. It must focus greater effort on building broad alliances for the future with countries that have not traditionally been considered key strategic partners, especially countries in Latin America and Africa. The State Department must safeguard its influence in international financial institutions in the face of a growing challenge from China. Meeting the increasingly diverse range of global challenges will require a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to diplomacy. The State Department will more than ever need the expertise found in a range of other government agencies and institutions, even as it needs to further develop its own in-house expertise. The growing influence of non-governmental and quasi-governmental organizations, whether Greenpeace, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, or a host of others, indicates the need to build relationships with them as well to influence policies and outcomes. The U.S. therefore must expand its ability to collaborate with other states through multilateral organizations, as well as with non-national entities, to achieve sustainable and meaningful results.

Today, the U.S. is a member of 79 recognized international organizations, including sub-organizations of the United Nations (UN) (See Annex 2). Most of these organizations are loosely categorized into four groups:

1. Economic, financial, and trade organizations
2. Security (including nuclear security)
3. Rule of law and humanitarian organizations
4. Environmental and health organizations

The scope of operations of international organizations and their impact on issues and nations that matter to the U.S. are vast. Yet the U.S. generally favors bilateral diplomacy, where it can use its economic, political, and security power to its advantage. Such an approach can work when the issues are strictly between the U.S. and another state, but it is less effective in dealing with regional and global issues, particularly where many states need to take action.

Multilateral diplomacy is rarely in the State Department's mainstream of policy attention or operations. As a result, the U.S. is not currently well-positioned for the diplomacy needed to meet 21st century national security challenges. Fundamental steps the Department must take include making multilateral diplomacy part of the Department's policy and operational mainstream and strengthening the Foreign and Civil Services' multilateral competencies. The Department should also consider where and how best to increase the U.S. presence on the secretariats of international organizations to enhance the overall U.S. role in shaping the agenda and work of these organizations. Additionally, the U.S. needs to pay arrears and remain current in its financial obligations to the international organizations of which it is a member.

In 2010, while serving as ambassador to the UN Organizations in Vienna (UNVIE), **Ambassador Glyn Davies** wrote in the *Foreign Service Journal*,

> "Where it once might have been argued that multilateral diplomacy was a mere addendum to the pursuit of the 'real' business of engaging nation-states bilaterally, now that logic is fraying…[W]e now have ample evidence that our most productive path in the 21st century is to retool our institutions and retrain our people to succeed in a world where new regional powers are ascendant and are working with each other, and with many other nations, to shape outcomes multilaterally – and not always in line with our interests."[2]

Ambassador Linda Thomas Greenfield echoed that observation at the confirmation hearing on her nomination to the office of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations on January 27, 2021:

> "If instead we walk away from the table, and allow others to fill the void, the global community suffers – and so do American interests."[3]

In his first major foreign policy speech at the State Department on March 4, 2021, **Secretary of State Antony Blinken** outlined eight priorities:[4]

1. Stopping COVID-19 and strengthening global health diplomacy.
2. Turning around the economic crisis and building a "more stable, inclusive global economy."
3. Renewing democracy.
4. Creating a "humane and effective immigration system."
5. Revitalizing ties with U.S. allies and partners.
6. Tackling climate change.
7. Securing a leadership position in technology.
8. Managing the U.S.-China relationship.

All of Secretary Blinken's foreign policy priorities listed above have global impact and must be addressed in global fora. Is it even possible to consider a U.S. strategy for dealing with China that does not include a multilateral diplomacy dimension? Establishing our priorities means putting resources to work on their achievement – beginning with the time and focus of the Department's senior leadership. And if, as we believe, these urgent global issues can only be successfully addressed through multilateral diplomacy, then we must devote more resources there as well.

To achieve priority U.S. foreign policy objectives in the coming decades, the Department will need to strengthen its commitment to multilateral diplomacy at the policy and operational levels. This will require sustained policy attention and guidance, trained and resourced staff, and clear priorities. Yet, multilateral diplomacy cannot be executed in isolation. The U.S. conducts diplomacy with organizations, but also with the member states of those organizations. Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, therefore, must be strategically coherent and complementary, even when advancing global priorities causes occasional friction in bilateral relations.

The State Department's policy orientation, training, and assignment incentives are heavily weighted to bilateral, not multilateral, diplomacy. In contrast, many other countries prioritize multilateral diplomacy, and their best diplomats often have extensive experience working in international organizations or serving in diplomatic missions to them, particularly the UN and regional organizations such as the European Union or the African Union. U.S. diplomats, on the other hand, may have highly successful careers without ever having served at a mission to an international organization, much less in the governing body of an international organization. Both career and non-career chiefs of missions to international organizations shared their concern that members of their staffs did not receive recognition in terms of onward assignment, promotion, or performance awards for the inherent difficulty and unique challenges of serving in a mission to an international organization. This needs to change.

The Department of State should develop a cadre of staff that is adept and deeply experienced in negotiations at international fora; understands how to work with and influence international organizations, their member states, and their staffs; and knows how to reach out to other parts of the U.S. government or the American private and academic sectors for expertise on specific issues relevant to dealing with multilateral challenges. Those serving in bilateral assignments are increasingly asked to engage and seek support for multilateral projects and actions. Achieving success will require a commitment to enhance training, encouragement and reward for assignments to international organizations and multilateral missions, and the development of a core cadre of multilateral expertise within the Foreign Service (FS) and the Department's Civil Service (CS).

In considering broadly the term multilateral diplomacy, this review examined four distinct functions or activities: the U.S. missions to international organizations; the U.S. presence in international organizations themselves; U.S. representation to specialized international conferences; and policy formulation and direction. We interviewed current and former U.S. government officials, and current and former foreign government and international organization officials with relevant policy and operational experience in multilateral diplomacy. We sought to identify best practices from others, as well as to examine what has worked well for us in the past.

The Department of State has 15 permanent missions to international organizations (See Annex 1). Many, but not all, are overseen by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO). In most cases, the U.S. is a member state of the organization; however, the U.S. also has permanent missions to organizations of which it is not a member,

such as the European Union, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Within the bodies of the international organizations themselves, since 2007, the U.S. has filled the position of UN Under Secretary General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). Additionally, U.S. citizens serve as executive heads of three of the 30 funds and programs, specialized agencies, and related organizations that comprise the Chief Executives Board of the United Nations: The World Bank Group, UNICEF, and the World Food Programme. A U.S. citizen also serves as president of the International Court of Justice. By comparison, Chinese citizens currently serve as Directors General or Secretaries General to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Telecommunications Union, and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO),* as well holding the position of Under Secretary General for the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA).

At NATO, U.S. officials occupy four of the 16 principal positions in the organization: Assistant Secretary General (ASG) for Operations, ASG for Intelligence and Security, Director of the NATO Office of Security, and Director of the NATO Office of Resources. At the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a U.S. national currently holds one of 23 senior positions in the body, director for Science, Technology, and Innovation. At the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), U.S. citizens currently hold two of 30 senior positions, head of the OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and director for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.**



In 2019, the U.S. government contributed slightly more than $11 billion to the UN. Approximately two-thirds of this total was voluntary, and one-third was assessed. For reference, this figure represents roughly one-fifth of the $50 billion that the U.S. spends annually on foreign aid. The UN activities with the largest budgets, whether funded from voluntary or assessed contributions, are peacekeeping operations ($6.5 billion total budget, with $1.9 billion from U.S. contributions), world food programs ($8 billion total budget with $3.37 billion from U.S.), and the high commission on refugees ($4.1 billion total contributions, with $1.7 billion of those from the U.S.).[6]

U.S. share of NATO's operating budget (civil, military, and security investment programs) is 16.5 percent for 2021. Germany's share of the NATO operating budget is identical

* The U.S. withdrew from UNIDO in 1996.

** All figures are current as of December 2020.

to that of the U.S., followed by the U.K., responsible for 11.29 percent, and France for 10.49 percent.[7]

In the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO), the Office of International Conferences is responsible for accrediting, instructing, and managing some 4,000 delegates to almost 400 multilateral conferences each year. Delegates to international conferences bring expertise from throughout the U.S. government, and strong leadership is critical to success. State's functional bureaus provide subject matter expertise to lead U.S. delegations to these multilateral conferences, requiring a keen understanding both of increasingly complex technical issues and the policy priorities of the Administration. Successful multilateral diplomacy requires a whole-of-government approach, in which State plays three key roles: it coordinates the interagency position, it leads delegations, and it supports multilateral negotiations via IO and other specialized functional bureaus such as the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB), or Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN). Many of the most challenging issues confronting the U.S., such as climate change, pandemics, and cyberspace, are not classic diplomatic issues, and the real subject matter expertise often resides outside the Department. State must be conversant in these topics, but its principal job is to coordinate the experts to advance our policy objectives and provide the essential framework of understanding who our partners and adversaries are, and what motivates them to support our positions.

Clearly, both in terms of financial and human capital investment, the U.S. is a major player in the multilateral arena. Yet the questions must be asked: Is the State Department investing its assets strategically? Is it prepared to address the global challenges of the 21st century that demand its full engagement in the practice of multilateral diplomacy?



The consensus among practitioners of multilateral diplomacy is that the Department of State tends to treat multilateral diplomacy as secondary to it traditional focus on bilateral diplomacy; in short, it lacks a clear strategic vision for multilateral engagement. Even as multilateral issues such as climate change, pandemics, and terrorism have become more urgent priorities, the Department's orientation has remained largely bilateral in terms of policy and fundamental processes, such as personnel assignments and promotions.

The Bureau of Global Talent Management's Professional Development Program Principles for Foreign Service generalists, promulgated in 2019, do require at least one assignment in a "global affairs" bureau

as a condition for promotion to senior ranks. Other requirements include long-term training, assignment in more than one region, and assignment to a 20 percent or greater hardship post. Given the relatively few Foreign Service positions in multilateral missions, imposing a hard requirement for experience in multilateral diplomacy as a prerequisite for promotion to senior ranks would not be feasible, but some acknowledgement of the importance of acquiring multilateral skills is in order.

In speaking to Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and Civil Service (CS) employees, both current and retired, about their experiences being assigned to multilateral missions or functions, several common themes emerge.

- One FSO with multilateral experience in domestic assignments was assigned as deputy chief of mission (DCM) to the U.S. mission to a UN organization. The FSO received no training prior to the assignment, and the chief of mission (COM) expressed some dismay that the new DCM did not know "the tricks of the trade." The DCM felt strongly disadvantaged by the lack of formal training and preparation for the position, especially when representing the U.S. at council meetings.
- A member of the CS Senior Executive Service was recruited to a position at an international security organization, where he served for several years. Upon his return to the Department, he was placed in a bureau that had no substantive connection to his most recent work, and where he had no opportunity to apply the knowledge and skills he had acquired.
- Another FSO who had been assigned both to the OSCE and NATO missions as a mid-level officer, and later as a head of section, noted that he had no opportunity for training in how to negotiate multilaterally prior to either assignment. His first formal training in negotiating skills was at the National War College, after 18 years in the Foreign Service.
- One FSO in the economic cone, having consistently sought out assignments in the multilateral arena, spoke with pride about the enormous responsibility of representing the U.S. at council meetings while still a mid-level officer, yet observed that promotion boards do not seem to place a high value on the impact of negotiating on behalf of the U.S. government.
- In an example of a successful career in multilateral diplomacy, one member of the CS Senior Executive Service was able to build on multilateral experience acquired working on issues at the Organization for American States with subsequent assignments to the U.S. missions to the UN agencies in Geneva and to UNESCO in Paris.

In setting the Administration's policy direction, the President has made clear that his highest priorities include both bilateral and multilateral issues. Achieving them will therefore require both bilateral and multilateral

diplomacy. Some bilateral issues, such as our relationship with China, require a strategic approach that integrates direct bilateral diplomacy with multilateral diplomacy on issues that are related to the Administration's overall China policy, such as strengthening the non-proliferation regime, preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism, and dealing with climate change. Similarly, multilateral objectives, such as in the World Trade Organization (WTO) or dealing with climate change, require direct U.S. engagement with key states, using bilateral diplomacy to support multilateral diplomacy.

The symbiotic nature of these two aspects of diplomacy is not consistently addressed in a State Department that is focused on bilateral relationships and often treats multilateral diplomacy as an afterthought or only episodically important. To overcome the silos that have grown over the years between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, the Secretary of State and his or her 7th Floor senior staff must ensure that regional and functional assistant secretaries communicate and collaborate closely to address the Administration's highest multilateral and bilateral priorities.

Given the importance of multilateral diplomacy for achieving priority global policy goals, as well as in support of bilateral policy goals, the Secretary must ensure the Department encourages its best FS and CS employees to be engaged in this effort.

Former assistant secretaries and principal deputies with whom we spoke called for a better balance of FS and CS positions in the functional bureaus and for better integration of the unique skills of each. They note the absence of any coherent career path in multilateral affairs for either FS or CS. Because positions in many of the functional bureaus are perceived by FSOs as less "promotable" than positions in the regional bureaus, they are harder to fill. On occasion, the bureau will convert a position to CS in order to fill it; however, once the position is filled with a CS employee, it will not become available again for an FSO until the CS employee departs. This reduces the opportunities available to FSOs, who rotate assignments every two or three years, to obtain multilateral experience that would enhance their effectiveness in future multilateral and bilateral jobs.

The key issue is how the State Department could offer a career path for mid-level officers of both the Civil and Foreign Services to gain expertise in multilateral diplomacy and prepare them to lead delegations, represent the U.S. in international organizations, and serve more effectively in bilateral relations. The current structures in the Department do not encourage such a path.

For FS members, assignments to U.S. missions to international organizations are not perceived as career enhancing. For example, assignment to hardship posts is a

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OFFICIAL TWITTER ACCOUNT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY MOLDOVA, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE / PUBLIC DOMAIN

Ambassador Dereck J. Hogan presents a donation of personal protective equipment from the U.S. military's European Command to the Isaac Gurfinchel Regional Hospital in Comrat, Moldova, on July 23, 2022.

requirement for promotion into the Senior Foreign Service, and promotion boards are instructed to consider service in hardship posts when making recommendations for promotion. The fact that many international organizations are in sophisticated cities in developed countries can, therefore, be a disincentive to taking a job in a multilateral mission. Similarly, since so few FSOs have experience in multilateral missions or functional bureaus, promotion panels are not as aware that effectiveness in those missions/bureaus requires mastery of skills that promotion boards deem essential for mid- and senior-level promotions.

It is in America's interest to have more U.S. citizens, including State Department staff, working in international organizations of which the U.S. is a member. Yet the challenges mentioned above along with the negative impact of effectively giving up promotion competitiveness for two or more years by leaving the Department for secondment to an international secretariat are powerful disincentives for Department staff, particularly FSOs, to take such jobs. Even learning about these assignment opportunities is hard to do because there is no single, consolidated list of such opportunities. Instead, information on potential international vacancies is scattered across multiple bureaus. As a result, the Bureau of Human Resources that makes assignments and maintains lists of available jobs does not have the information about opportunities in multilateral organizations. Despite these drawbacks, senior leaders who have had the opportunity to serve earlier in their careers in an international organization secretariat strongly believe that the experience was invaluable to their later careers, that such opportunities must be sought out for mid-level officers, and that service in such positions should be appropriately recognized in the promotions and assignments processes.

Encouraging mid-level officers to acquire specialized experience in multilateral diplomacy, ensuring they are not disadvantaged by such assignments, and actively recruiting for onward assignments that utilize the skills acquired in a multilateral assignment must become Department priorities if it is to strengthen its multilateral diplomacy capacity. The U.S. also benefits on those occasions when American diplomats near or at the end of their careers are selected for a policymaking position in an international organization. Despite the value to the U.S. and the Department, our review found such officials generally go into such jobs with no briefings or other preparation or support from the Department.

For CS employees, the rank-in-position structure inherently limits their career mobility. There is no equivalent to the FS' pattern of reassignment to new positions every two to three years. The Bureau of Global Talent Management's Office of Civil Service Talent Management has focused considerable effort and attention on professional development for CS employees, but opportunities remain limited. Opportunities for CS personnel to serve overseas are scarce. The challenge of backfilling a position for the duration of the employee's absence remains a major impediment. Yet in many of our missions to specialized organizations, the lead bureau at State is a functional bureau, and the deepest bench of subject matter experts are CS. The Department has considered in the past the possibility of making its CS component an excepted service, along the model of some other agencies in the intelligence community, and a recent report by the American Academy of Diplomacy recommended that up to 10 percent of State's CS employees be included in a new excepted service to provide more flexibility.[9] While earlier discussion did not result in action, this proposal has merit and deserves reconsideration. Absent such a structural change, however, the Department should make greater effort to ensure that its CS experts have opportunities to serve overseas, either in U.S. missions or in the secretariats of international organizations.

A former senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) observed that the Department needs to consider its strategic priorities and properly staff them, on par with other global players. We should be sending our best and brightest to international organizations and we need our promotions and assignments systems to recognize the complexity and the challenge inherent in these assignments and reward them accordingly. China is already positioning itself strategically, identifying highly technical and specialized organizations and staffing them generously with qualified technocrats. China is now in a much better position to influence the rule-making process and implementation to its advantage.

The same former official at CSIS also noted that as global issues become more complex, the U.S. needs State Department officers to become conversant, if not fluent, in new languages – languages of arms control, public health, communications technology, trade, cyber security, and climate change, among others. Gaining this fluency can only

come from direct experience on the issues through multilateral diplomacy.

Other observers of international diplomacy are noting the growing importance of multilateral diplomacy and the need for the U.S. to strengthen its capacity in this area. CSIS's Daniel Runde and Kristen Cordell called for more diverse U.S. representation in international organizations. They note that the appointment of a Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer at the State Department represents not only an exceptional opportunity to improve diversity within the Department but could serve as "a pivot point for more inclusive representation in international organizations." The U.S., they say, must expand its representation at all levels, both high-level leadership and mid-level and junior staff positions. They further underscore that, "**To maintain low representation, or homogeneous representation, in these international organizations, is to forfeit U.S. interests in global public goods, international standards, and even the values of transparency and equity."**[10] And just as improving diversity in our own diplomatic representation is vital to our long-term interests, so is encouraging greater diversity in other nations' diplomatic engagement.

A senior official at the UN Foundation observed that the State Department's greatest asset is its talented and dedicated Foreign and Civil Services and recommended that the Department strive to provide more opportunities for officers to serve in the UN itself. He noted that U.S. military officers seconded to UN peacekeeping operations are highly valued by the UN and expressed the belief that more U.S. civilian engagement within the UN bodies would build capacity in both organizations. He flagged language contained in the Senate's bipartisan draft "Strategic Competition Act" under consideration in the 117th Congress (S. 1169, Sec. 217 "Advancing United States Leadership in the United Nations System") that would establish a Special Representative and deputy assistant secretary in the IO bureau to assume responsibility, among others things, for "promoting United States leadership and participation in the United Nations system;" "highlighting how investments in the United Nations advance United States interests and enable stronger coalitions;" and "assessing how United States decisions to withdraw from United Nations bodies impacts United States influence at the United Nations and multilateral global initiatives."[11]

Encouraging mid-level officers to acquire specialized experience in multilateral diplomacy, ensuring they are not disadvantaged by such assignments, and actively recruiting for onward assignments that utilize the skills acquired in a multilateral assignment must become Department priorities if it is to strengthen its multilateral diplomacy capacity.

LOOKING AT OTHER COUNTRIES

In examining how other diplomatic services regard multilateral diplomacy, it is important to understand that comparing the U.S. to almost any other country is an unequal comparison. Since World War II, the U.S. had enough political, economic, and military power that it could generally pursue its interests directly with other states, rather than having to rely on international organizations. Nonetheless, the U.S. was a principal architect of post-war multilateral organizations.

Because other nations cannot match the global influence of the U.S., they place a premium on their presence in multilateral institutions, where they can leverage limited power and join forces through transactional tradeoffs. Some of the most adept practitioners of multilateral diplomacy are small nations that send their best diplomats to the United Nations for lengthy tours of duty. These diplomats become highly influential in regional voting blocs and skilled in navigating the complexities of UN procedures. As a result, they are well-regarded by other diplomats at the UN as key, go-to leaders on important subjects. Additionally, many organizations have de facto quota systems to ensure balanced representation among blocs of smaller states. For European diplomats, there is the additional fact of membership in the European Union, which requires engagement both as member states (multilateral) and as sending states (bilateral). Thus, for many other foreign services, and particularly European ones, multilateral engagement is essential, and multilateral assignments are prestigious and highly sought after.

PHOTO BY STATE DEPARTMENT

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken meets with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., January 5, 2022.

Some countries that consistently perform well in the multilateral arena do so because for them it is the best forum, perhaps the only forum, to influence global decision-making. In an article for *The Review of International Organizations,* Paul Novosad and Eric Werker assess that by comparing the share of senior UN Secretariat positions held by a country to that country's share of world population, the UN system is dominated by rich democracies – the top five being Finland, Sweden, Norway, New Zealand, and Ireland. For other countries whose small populations limit their ability to engage broadly in bilateral diplomacy, multilateral fora represent the most effective and efficient way to make their fewer but more important voices heard.[12]

Yet, smaller countries are not the only ones that view multilateral diplomacy as an important part of their foreign policy arsenal. France and Germany have historically placed high value on multilateral relations and continue to do so going forward.[13] The United Kingdom, despite its recent withdrawal from the European Union, renewed its engagement in other international organizations, as described by Thomas Wright at Brookings.[14] Japan has also systematically pursued multilateral diplomacy ever since its admission into the UN in 1965.[15] And for the last decade, China has significantly expanded its effort to increase its clout in international organizations by positioning its best and brightest in various multilateral leadership roles.[16] These five countries are all much larger and exert a much greater political, economic, and social influence in the world. Their diplomatic services are also much more comparable to that of the U.S. Foreign Service, which is why the approaches used by these countries toward multilateral diplomacy constitute particularly useful examples for comparison and for informing our recommendations for enhancing U.S. multilateral diplomacy. We review each of these examples individually below.

Germany

A former German ambassador to the UN observed that his own career path had been shaped by his second assignment, which was to the UN in New York. Like the U.S. Foreign Service, his first assignment after completing training at the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic academy had been directed. Unlike the U.S. A-100 course, his initial training was two full years (this has since been shortened to one year). The training included several weeks dedicated to multilateral diplomacy, both in the specific context of the European Union and more broadly. The ambassador noted that there is a unit of the Foreign Ministry's human resources department exclusively dedicated to placing German diplomats and career civil servants into international organization bodies. These placements may or may not be permanent; in the case of German diplomats, they are expected to return to the Foreign Ministry upon completion of the assignment. He acknowledged that secondments outside the German diplomatic service are not always perceived to be career-enhancing, but rather out of sight, out of mind. On the other hand, New York, Brussels, Vienna, and Geneva are considered plum assignments. Prior experience in multilateral diplomacy is a requirement for appointment as ambassador to an international organization.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (U.K.). has a well-established track record for effectiveness in multilateral diplomacy. One former British ambassador to the United Nations noted that the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (now the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, FCDO) places a high priority on multilateral diplomacy, ensuring that its strongest performers serve in multiple multilateral assignments across the span of a career. Prior to the U.K.'s departure from the European Union, its diplomats could move with relative ease between representing the U.K. and representing the E.U.

A senior analyst at the FCDO assesses that after a period of relative disengagement, the U.K. is now refocusing its efforts on multilateral diplomacy. He noted that the FCDO has a multilateral research group whose purpose is to provide a deep bench of historical background and analysis in multilateral affairs. He compared it to State's Intelligence and Research (INR) bureau, without the "I," but with a policy voice. It is that office, for example, that often drafts instructions to delegations.

Assignments to the U.K.'s missions to international organizations are generally for four years, and heads of delegation generally have prior multilateral experience, although that is not a hard requirement. Secondments to international organizations are not perceived as career-enhancing, a cultural shift from two decades ago. Today, the U.K. focuses its efforts on putting the right people at the top of international organizations, making the conscious decision that the critical objective is not to learn the international workings of the organization, it is to influence policy. To be sure, the U.K. diplomatic service is much smaller than the U.S. Foreign Service and has structural differences such as no "up or out" promotion system that make it easier to move in and out of the multilateral sphere. Even so, the importance that the U.K. places on the development of expertise in multilateral diplomacy is doubtless the basis for the U.K.'s consistent ability to punch above its weight.

Japan

Like the U.K., Japan has recently begun a conscious pivot toward multilateral engagement. A former Japanese ambassador to a UN agency and later Special Representative for the Secretary General noted that Japan was keenly disappointed at having been rebuffed in its quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council, but nonetheless, multilateral engagement remains essential to achievement of Japanese foreign policy objectives. As Japan became a major economic power, he said, it found its corresponding foreign policy voice in the assemblies of international organizations.

While there is no multilateral career track per se for multilateral specialists in the Japanese foreign service, assignments to international organizations are highly coveted and only diplomats with prior multilateral experience are generally competitive for assignment to senior positions such as heads of delegation. One Japanese diplomat's career included assignments as a first secretary to the UN mission in New York, director of peacekeeping operations at the Japanese foreign ministry, counselor to the UN agencies in Geneva, vice director general of the Ministry's International Organizations bureau, and ambassadorial postings to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

Again, like the U.K., Japan prioritizes placing the right people in senior positions within international organizations – assistant secretary general, D-2, or D-1 level. Candidates for these jobs do not come exclusively from the Foreign Ministry; the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister consult with other agencies and departments to ensure that a Japanese candidate for a senior position has the necessary subject matter expertise. The candidate, if successful, may be assigned to the international organization for three to five years, but many opt to stay on after the completion of the assignment. Recently, Japan has made an effort to "re-recruit" key officials back to the Japanese diplomatic or civil service.



France

France also takes a strategic approach to multilateral engagement. Because many of France's civil service members come from a handful of institutions, the "grandes ecoles," their cohort is quite cohesive and characterized by a significant degree of flexibility to move between sectors of public and private service, or between positions in the French diplomatic service and positions in international organizations. Like the U.K., the French diplomatic service does not have an "up or out" promotion system. Beyond cultivating multilateral expertise within its own ranks, France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs dedicates an office exclusively to the purpose of encouraging French nationals to apply for international posts, the "Delegation aux Fonctionnaires Internationaux." That office maintains a current listing of all vacant positions in key international organizations (not limited to UN organizations), searchable by key functions. It provides information to assist applicants and advocates for key positions.

China

And what about China? Both within the U.S. diplomatic community and in the diplomatic services of other countries, there is general agreement that China has in recent years made a concerted effort to assert itself in multilateral diplomacy, paralleling its growing bilateral influence. With its economic and technological capacity and fast-growing diplomatic presence overseas (now overtaking the U.S. in terms of universal presence), China has influence on a scale we have not previously seen. China is aggressive in seeking out leadership positions in international organizations, and in cultivating strategic or tactical allies in its efforts to position itself to good advantage. In the assessment of several analysts, China is not yet highly skilled at building consensus, which is essential to effective multilateral diplomacy, but it is quickly learning.

At her January 26 confirmation hearing, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo stated that the Commerce Department needs not only to play defense against China, but to play offense by doing more to promote U.S. technology, including getting more involved in the global organizations that set standards.[17] Another senior U.S. official concurred, observing that early on, China targeted organizations, often specialized and technical in nature, and populated those organizations with highly qualified technocrats. Now, she said, China is in an excellent position to "set the rules" on things such as digital standards. At 12.005 percent, China is also the second-largest contributor to the UN budget, though still nowhere near the U.S.'s 22 percent. As China continues to grow its financial and human investments in the UN, its influence will also increase.

CONSIDERING THE FUTURE

In looking at how the Department of State might better position itself to address global issues in the present and near future, we must consider three dimensions: policy, practice, and preparation.

Are State's policymakers and processes attuned to the growing importance of multilateral diplomacy to the Administration's policy priorities for global issues, such as climate change, and bilateral challenges, such as China?

To what extent do the Department's culture and personnel practices succeed in aligning talent to its highest policy priorities, which increasingly must include the development of multilateral diplomacy skills and experience?

How can the Department prepare better, through formal training and developmental assignments, to engage in multilateral diploacy?

Returning to Secretary Blinken's March 4, 2021, foreign policy address, three of the eight priorities he articulated are focused on environment, science, technology, and health, areas of expertise that the Department has not traditionally given much attention. In most embassies, the environment, science, technology and health (ESTH) portfolio, if there is one at all, is located within the economic section, and in all, except perhaps the largest embassies, staffed by a single officer. Yet ESTH issues loom increasingly large, both in complexity and

STATE DEPARTMENT PHOTO BY RON PRZYSUCHA/ PUBLIC DOMAIN

Department of State Student Interns at an event with the U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., on August 9, 2019.

impact, in our foreign policy agenda. Despite COVID response and health diplomacy ranking first among Secretary Blinken's priorities, the Department lacks coherent organization and is woefully understaffed to provide expertise and exert U.S. leadership in these areas.

Harvard University's Belfer Center report, "A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century," authored by Ambassadors Nicholas Burns, Marc Grossman, and Marcie Ries, recommended to "strengthen the professionalism of our diplomats through a vastly expanded career-long program of education and training that focuses on mastery of substantive foreign policy issues, diplomatic expertise and leadership."[18] Diplomatic expertise must include expertise in multilateral diplomacy to staff and lead our missions to international organizations, work effectively within those international organizations, and influence the policy agenda and the outcomes. Leadership must include the skills to lead multi-agency delegations and negotiate multilaterally.

The report also recommended for the Department to "initiate a wholesale overhaul of the personnel system, to make it more modern, flexible, transparent, and strategically oriented to future challenges and workforce needs." Two key features of this recommendation are to replace the current system of functional cones with multifunctional competence and prioritize development of regional and linguistic expertise. As the need for officers with skills

beyond the traditional scope of political and economic affairs grows, and as diplomacy's center stage shifts from bilateral to multilateral, the Department must be able to recruit, train, assign, and promote its FSOs accordingly.

The Department's CS provides deep expertise in many highly specialized fields that the FS, by its nature of regular rotation of assignments, cannot easily match. Just as bilateral and multilateral diplomacy are complementary efforts toward a common goal, so too are the FS and the CS complementary resources with different skill sets collaborating to a common purpose. Taking steps to break down the silos that too often divide the two services will strengthen both. To this end, this project endorses previous recommendations from the Partnership for Public Service and this Academy, among others, to seek Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approval to establish a pilot program for an excepted CS at the Department of State.

Many senior diplomats who have served in leadership positions in international organizations describe a steep learning curve of multilateral diplomacy and underscore the advantages of prior experience and formal training. In many cases, the appointment of a senior officer to a leadership position in an international organization (Assistant Secretary General at NATO, Under Secretary General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Libya) comes only at the end of the person's Foreign Service career. In some cases, the appointee brought lengthy experience in multilateral diplomacy; for others, it was their maiden voyage. One former senior FSO, a former ambassador and assistant secretary, shared his surprise at having been selected for a senior position in an international organization secretariat for which he was told he had no official support or endorsement, and for which he received no training or even briefings by the Department. Another described having been recruited by a senior UN official, again, at the end of a distinguished FS career and with no endorsement or support from the Department.

Under the broad definition of multilateral diplomacy, we have identified three distinct functions: service in U.S. missions to multilateral organizations, service within international organizations, and representation on delegations to international negotiations or conferences. The first and the third are perhaps more accessible to most Department of State employees than is the second, yet each of the three provides unique experiences and imparts valuable skills.

The IO bureau manages six missions to international organizations overseas, as well as the USUN mission in New York. We do not have data on the precise number of positions in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR), the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA), and other bureaus dedicated to staffing the missions to international organizations that fall under their control; however, we can safely assume that none of these missions are exceptionally large. The number of positions in U.S. missions to multilateral organizations is quite limited. Imposing a hard requirement for experience in a multilateral mission as a condition for promotion to the senior foreign service would be impossible for most FSOs to achieve given the limited number of such positions and the additional constraints posed by grade levels and rotation cycles.

Experience in multilateral diplomacy may also be acquired through service in positions in functional bureaus and regional bureaus that focus on multilateral organizations and issues. Preparing for and

participating in international conferences offer excellent opportunities at a range of levels of experience to learn the intricacies of multilateral negotiation. Yet functional bureaus overseeing global issues have relatively few domestic FS positions, in contrast to the regional bureaus. This imbalance should be corrected, and it will require committed senior Department leadership to get that done, including making such assignments more meaningful for career development and promotion.

With respect to opportunities for service in an international organization, the Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs has a website dedicated to providing information about job opportunities in international organizations, https://iocareers.state.gov. It contains a wealth of information about the application and selection processes for students, Federal employees, and others. In mid-May the website listed more than 2,000 entries. Many were highly technical in nature, but there were several dozen professional positions, including executive level positions and positions responsible for policy, finance, public affairs, human resources, security, and information technology. The website provides information about how to apply to federal government employees as well as to students and private sector applicants, but it is not easily located via the Department's own homepage. Linking opportunities for secondments or details to international organizations to open assignments information would be a positive step to generate interest in such assignments.

Expanding the number and type of opportunities available to both FS and CS employees to develop expertise in multilateral diplomacy is one challenge. Even more difficult is to change the culture that views assignments to multilateral organizations or functional bureaus as not as career-enhancing as assignment to embassies or regional bureaus. Regional expertise, including language skills, has long been considered the essential building block to career advancement. Several Directors General have sought to enhance the competencies of the FS by introducing a variety of requirements for promotion into the senior service, including service in more than one region, functional as well as regional assignments, foreign language competence, training, and assignment to extreme hardship or unaccompanied posts. The current Professional Development Plan for Foreign Service Generalists (PDP) calls for all these requirements to be met as a condition for eligibility for senior promotion. It remains to be seen whether the PDP will influence the assignment preferences of FSOs, but unless promotion precepts give more weight to the complexity and impact of multilateral diplomacy, and to the skills and competencies acquired in such assignments, they will continue to be less attractive.

Formal training should also be employed to enhance the multilateral diplomacy skills of both the FS and the CS. The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) offers courses in negotiation, including the Psychology of Negotiating, the Art and Skills of International Negotiations, and Advanced International Negotiations. Also offered are a course on multilateral diplomacy, one on the foundations of international law, and a distance-learning course on preparing for international organization meetings. While short, focused training is useful, it does not replace more in-depth study of complex topics. As recommended in the Belfer Center's "A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century," the Department should "strengthen the professionalism of our diplomats through a vastly expanded career-

PHOTO BY STATE DEPARTMENT

The United States delivers 821,340 COVID-19 vaccine doses to Sri Lanka, on December 22, 2021.

long program of education and training that focuses on mastery of substantive foreign policy issues, diplomatic expertise and leadership." This expanded training program should include training in multilateral diplomacy and negotiating skills at the entry level, as well as in training in preparation for senior responsibilities, including senior threshold training.

The French Foreign Ministry's website describes in some detail its training programs for both entry-level and senior threshold diplomats. Entry-level training is a full 14 weeks, with time devoted to negotiation, diplomatic writing, multilateral and global issues, and public speaking. French diplomats may also be selected to participate in mid-level training prior to assuming supervisory positions at the office director or equivalent level, after approximately 15 years of service. This mid-level training, undertaken concurrently with a domestic assignment, offers both formal training modules and personal mentoring. According to the Foreign Ministry's website, the training course "aims to strengthen the managerial skills and leadership capacities of diplomats, as well as to deepen their knowledge on the priority areas of our international action, including economic diplomacy, soft diplomacy, security and defense, European affairs, and climate change." The personal mentor offers coaching, as well as a personal assessment of the participants, and remains a mentor beyond the end of the training program. And as we have previously cited, the German Foreign Ministry places significant emphasis both on training new officers and on placing

diplomats and civil servants from other government agencies into international organization bodies.

A former British ambassador to the UN shared the practice of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) to send a number of entry-level diplomats each year to New York for up to three months, to assist the British mission to prepare for the annual UN General Assembly. This temporary assignment provides much-needed surge capacity, as well as giving junior diplomats valuable exposure to the practice of multilateral diplomacy. Another senior official in the FCDO's multilateral research group noted that his office sends an analyst to New York regularly, to provide on-site briefings and orientation to newly assigned members of the U.K. mission to the UN. Included in the orientation are sessions on how to negotiate in the UN. Many sources speak highly of the UN's Junior Professional Officer (JPO) program as one vehicle to provide multilateral experience

Case Study

Case studies offer the possibility of drawing lessons learned from prior experiences. Understanding the factors that contributed to success or failure may influence diplomats' strategies for future negotiations. The following case study, authored by Ambassador Robert Cekuta, demonstrates the power and the impact of multilateral diplomacy.

U.S. Multilateral Diplomacy in the International Energy Agency

United States engagement with the International Energy Agency (IEA) shows how U.S. diplomacy can reshape a multilateral organization and in so doing advance American interests.

Established following the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the IEA was designed to help ensure the United States and other western democracies that were members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) would be prepared for future oil supply shortfalls and manage their impact on citizens, should they occur. The focus was monitoring oil supplies and ensuring members' strategic oil reserves were sufficient to ameliorate the effect of any future oil supply disruptions. By the 2010s, however, shifting global energy patterns, the growing importance of fuels other than oil, and other factors meant changes were needed in the IEA's structure, in how it worked, and how it served its members. Energy security now meant an assured, predictable supply of *energy* — not just oil — at reasonable prices. Dramatically growing energy consumption in China and other emerging market economies meant an agency that just looked at OECD economies and coordinated among them no longer served well the United States and its allies and partners.

Starting in 2012, State Department and Department of Energy representatives to the IEA began working with the Agency's secretariat and key members to reshape the Agency to account for what was happening in an evolving global energy sector.

A primary effort was to broaden the engagement between the IEA and its members with China, India, and other major emerging market economies. These economies needed increasing amounts of energy and were replacing the IEA's

to their junior officers. A search of the State Department's website reveals that the bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration sponsors qualified U.S. citizens for employment in the UNHCR and IOM Junior Professional Officer programs. Senior leadership in the IO bureau support broader participation in the JPO program but note that it is quite expensive.

If the Department of State is to maintain its leadership in the world, it must pay more attention to the multilateral arenas in which global issues are debated and global challenges addressed. It must do a better job of preparing diplomats for multilateral diplomacy, and it must demonstrate through promotions and other recognition that it places a high value on the mastery of multilateral diplomacy. It must clearly identify its priorities and deploy its resources accordingly. This will require the Department's leadership to make strategic decisions about where U.S. influence makes the most difference and ensure that highly experienced leaders fill key positions. It also means acknowledging that withholding payment of U.S. assessed contributions damages our credibility and erodes our influence.

members as the most significant drivers in the increased global demand for oil and other fuels. With U.S. encouragement, the IEA Secretariat increased engagement with specific key emerging market economies to learn more about their energy sectors and how they seemed likely to develop as well as gauge interest in a closer, structured relationship with the IEA and its members. These emerging market countries were interested, but had questions about how they might fit in with an organization whose charter seemed to limit membership to OECD countries. Another concern of these governments was whether a number of like-countries would enter into a relationship with the IEA at the same time so that no one or two new partners would feel isolated. At the same time, there were concerns among existing members over whether their voices would be diminished as counties such as China, South Africa, or Indonesia became associated with the IEA. A highly coordinated approach by State and Energy Department officials that included direct conversations with capitals, side conversations and formal interventions in IEA meetings, and discussions with the Agency's Secretariat enabled us to identify problems, address concerns, and help shape the process as appropriate. The IEA's membership of OECD countries was expanded and today there are eight Associated Countries: Brazil, China, Indonesia, India, Morocco, Singapore, South Africa, and Thailand.

A similar effort by the State Department and Energy successfully broadened the IEA's work and lessened the over-riding focus on oil. This same period saw the huge increase in production and use of natural gas in the United States as well as of renewable energy. Important as well was the need to address climate change and carbon emissions. Again, U.S. diplomacy had positive results. Through formal and informal meetings with the Secretariat's leadership and other officials, efforts to re-shape the agenda of the Agency's meetings and scope of work, and talking with other governments' representatives both in the meeting rooms and after they were back in their capitals, we broadened the scope of the IEA's work, increased attention on renewables and other increasingly important sources of needed energy, and improved governments' abilities when it came to crafting energy and climate policies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations fall into three categories: policy, practice, and preparation. They may also be categorized by their resource impact. Some may be implemented with little or no immediate resource impact; others are dependent upon the Department being adequately staffed to build a training float, for example.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Achieving priority multilateral policy goals requires more than high-level speeches and visits or participating in meetings of multilateral organizations, such as the UN or NATO. As Secretary of State George Shultz noted, diplomacy is like gardening, it needs to be tended to consistently. Progress is incremental and daily interactions can set the stage for summit achievements. But this takes a clear message from the top about what is important and what is expected. The Secretary of State, therefore, needs to make clear to the Department the importance of multilateral diplomacy in addressing some of the Administration's highest priority global and bilateral objectives and his or her determination that the Department will strengthen its capacity for effective multilateral diplomacy.

Multilateral diplomacy and bilateral diplomacy should be consciously coordinated and complementary; U.S. diplomacy in separate silos will be much less effective. International organizations are the sum of their member states; policy direction generally comes from member-state capitals. As a result, the Department must ensure that bilateral chiefs of mission are informed and engaged in the achievement of the Administration's highest global priorities. Similarly, multilateral issues, processes, and organizations can play an important role in bilateral relationships and should be figured into longer term strategies for countries such as China, Russia, and Iran.

Policy execution is usually influenced by people within organizations. The U.S. is currently under-represented in the secretariats of international organizations. Ambassador John Negroponte noted that the U.S. has a high level of success in its multilateral diplomacy efforts but has not made enough effort to place U.S. personnel in leadership positions in international organizations.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1 Recognizing that both formal quotas and unwritten agreements may limit the number of positions in international bodies that can be filled by U.S. citizens, the Department and the Administration must make strategic decisions about where our long-term multilateral interests lie and seek to fill key positions accordingly and more generally increase the number of Americans, whether U.S. officials or private citizens, serving in IO secretariats.

A. The Secretary should issue a statement to the Department's workforce on the importance he or she and the President attach to multilateral diplomacy and direct a senior-level review, led by the Deputy Secretary and with the participation of both deputy secretaries and all under secretaries, to determine how best to strengthen the Department's multilateral leadership, both abroad and within the U.S. interagency. He or she should require a written report of results of the review, including identifying resources that will be needed, as well as periodic updates on their implementation.

B. Under the leadership of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Department should identify the international organizations in which we have vital strategic interests and prioritize placing Americans in senior positions (assistant secretary equivalent and above). The Department should then recruit, screen, and advocate for qualified and diverse candidates to fill those positions.

C. The Department must do a better job of integrating multilateral and bilateral issues and communicating priorities to the field. Embassies receive hundreds of demarche instructions each year, often with little indication of what priority the Administration places on the subject of the demarche. Devising a way to communicate its priorities in its instructions to the field should be a specific task of the review cited in recommendation 1A.

D. To overcome the silos that have developed over the years in the Department between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, the Secretary and his or her 7th Floor senior staff must ensure that regional and functional assistant secretaries communicate and collaborate closely to address the Administration's highest multilateral and bilateral priorities. The Secretary needs to convey his or her expectation that State will routinely merge its bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in service of the Administration's goals, for example by ensuring agendas for all bilateral meetings of the Secretary have a multilateral component. This can be done routinely in staff meetings and regularly during policy reviews, with the support of the Secretary's Policy Planning staff.

2 The Department must build strong relationships with a wider-than-ever range of government agencies and organizations to reassert Department leadership in foreign affairs in the interagency process.

A. Following the review described in 1A, the Secretary should meet with his or her Cabinet colleagues to brief them on the importance of multilateral diplomacy to the Administration's foreign policy and national security goals, review what State is doing to strengthen its multilateral operational and strategic capacity, and stress that the Secretary and their staff will be reaching out to all Cabinet agencies and independent agencies for support and to collaborate on addressing the Administration's global agenda.

3 The President's letter of instruction to ambassadors should include language to stress the importance that the President attaches to bilateral ambassadors being an essential part of the Administration's multilateral team.

A. As countries prepare to assume leadership roles in international organizations (e.g., election to a term on the UN Security Council) the Department should routinely engage chiefs of mission assigned to those countries to provide them with detailed information on key issues and U.S. interests and objectives within the international organization.

B. Depending on the scope and impact of the organization, the Department may consider the value of inviting the chief of mission back to Washington for interagency consultations, for example, when new members are elected to the UN security council or to the governing bodies of other international organizations. In the summer before the attendance of new members at their first UN Security Council meeting, a trip to their countries by the U.S. Representative or one of the Deputies would be valuable. Consultations would offer a dual benefit of better preparing the bilateral ambassador to address key issues and defend U.S. positions in the international organizations as well as offering to IO and the relevant U.S. multilateral mission key insights about the incoming member state's leadership, policy objectives, and "red lines."

PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

Global issues require the Department to seek out and develop new skills sets among its workforce. As the Department focuses its effort on building a more diverse workforce, it must ensure that candidates with skills in environment, science, technology, and health are a target population for recruitment for both CS and FS positions.

As is the case with many other diplomatic services, the State Department does not have an established multilateral career path for either the FS or the CS. This report does not propose to establish a new, multilateral "cone or career track" within the FS, or to require service in a multilateral organization as a condition for promotion to the Senior Foreign Service; however, the Department has practices and policies in place that could be adapted to offer more opportunities and greater reward for service in multilateral diplomacy.

As our global engagement increasingly demands subject matter expertise outside the traditional scope of the State Department, the role of other agencies in diplomacy has likewise increased, both overseas in the composition of our embassies and missions, and in the agencies' headquarters in the U.S. Numerous agencies have for some time staffed their own global or international affairs bureaus to lead their international engagement. More exchange between other agencies' global affairs bureaus and the Department would benefit the U.S. both domestically and at our overseas missions.

PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

1 The Department should take concrete steps to better integrate multilateral diplomacy policy priorities into its FS recruitment and promotion processes.

A. As the Department acquires additional positions, it should undertake a global review of its FS and CS staffing and recommend adjustments to align human capital with policy priorities. This may include adding or reassigning FS positions to functional bureaus that currently have very few FS positions, and it should include establishing a training float.

B. To compensate for the disadvantages in terms of perceived loss of promotion competitiveness resulting from detail or secondment to an international organization or other body outside the Department, consider adapting the current practice of paired assignments or assignment via long-term language training. The Department's practice of pairing some assignments to bilateral missions in selected countries with a one-year assignment to that host nation's foreign ministry has been very successful and could be applied to multilateral assignments. A two-part assignment consisting of a one- to two-year detail or secondment outside the Department followed immediately by a two- to three-year assignment to a position relevant to the first assignment would serve the Department's interests as well as the employee's. To further compensate for any loss of promotion competitiveness resulting from assignment outside the Department, employees taking such assignments should be granted an arrangement to prepare efficiency reports by knowledgeable senior officers on such assignees and an additional year of time in class for each year of that assignment.

C. When negotiating promotion precepts with the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), give greater weight to the complexity and impact of positions engaged in multilateral diplomacy. Ensure that the core competencies for promotion in the FS include multilateral experience and/or functional subject matter expertise.

PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

2 The Department should enhance its focus on environment, science, technology, and health (ESTH) as part of its recruitment efforts, especially for careers in international organizations.

A. For FS applicants, consider awarding additional "points" on the FSO test to candidates with ESTH backgrounds. Strengthening the Department's expertise in these critical areas, especially health, will be essential to its ability to lead the Administration's diplomatic agenda.

B. A consistent best practice among other foreign services highly regarded in the practice of multilateral diplomacy is their active engagement in the selection and placement of qualified persons to international organizations. Germany, France, Japan, and the U.K. all consider it part of their mandate to vet, support, and advocate for qualified candidates for international positions. The IO bureau's website, https://iocareers.state.gov/Main/Home, offers an exhaustive list of job opportunities in international organizations, yet information about them does not seem to be pushed out to FSOs at bidding season, or to CS employees or applicants for internships. All three of these populations are excellent potential target audiences, as indeed are employees of other U.S. government agencies. Transitioning the website from a passive information source into an active recruitment tool would require resources, but if the Department is to expand its presence in international organizations, this is an excellent place to focus additional effort.

PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

3 The Department should take concrete steps to alter its CS personnel structure and recruitment process to better accommodate and strengthen its multilateral diplomacy staffing needs.

A. The Department's CS is a valuable repository of deep subject matter expertise, often called upon to lead delegations and support international conferences and meetings. The U.S. missions to international organizations would benefit from resident expertise on key subjects. The Department should identify positions at its multilateral missions that could be filled equally by CS or FS employees and advertise them accordingly. In the event a CS employee were selected to fill an overseas position for a period of two or three years, the domestic position vacated by the CS employee could be temporarily filled with a FS employee. Ideally, positions filled in this manner would include an overlap with the departing officer to ensure time for transfer of critical knowledge.

B. As previously recommended by this Academy and by the Partnership for Public Service, among others, the Department should seek Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approval to establish a pilot program for an excepted CS at the Department of State.

C. Engage other U.S. government agencies in a discussion of developing a pilot program to offer State Department employees – both CS and FS – the opportunity to work for one or two years in the global affairs office of another U.S. government agency, and for members of other agencies to do a similar detail in the State Department.

4 Although it affects only a small number of employees, the Department should address the long-standing inequity in its policy of housing allowances for personnel assigned to the USUN mission in New York.

PREPARATION RECOMMENDATIONS

Training is an essential component of developing skills and competencies that are critical to the art of diplomacy. Multilateral diplomacy requires a unique set of skills and competencies, among which are negotiating skills and a deep understanding of how international bodies operate. Acquiring these skills and competencies cannot be achieved in classroom study alone, yet formal training should not be undervalued as a component of the diplomatic toolkit. The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) offers courses that address various aspects of multilateral diplomacy, including courses on the UN and negotiating skills. What we have seen anecdotally, however, is that training offered does not necessarily mean training completed.

Additionally, a best practice gleaned from consultations with other nations' diplomatic services is that of longer and more intense training upon entry into service. Building a "training float" has for decades been an elusive goal, as staffing shortfalls overseas and domestically take precedence when it comes to assigning new positions. But as numerous previous studies have made clear, training is an essential component of career development, and more resources must be dedicated thereto.

PREPARATION RECOMMENDATIONS

1

The Department should lengthen the training program at entry to the FS and add components on global issues and the art of negotiation. Multilateral diplomacy should also be included as a focus of any mid- or senior-threshold training offered by the Department, including the deputy chief of mission (DCM)/principal officer seminar.

2

The Department should offer specialized multilateral diplomacy and negotiation training for all employees assigned to a multilateral mission.

A. For FS employees assigned for the first time to a multilateral mission, ensure that training in multilateral negotiations and other relevant formal training courses offered by FSI are built into each employee's transfer schedule. Ensure that CS employees are aware of and have equal access to the same training, as may be required or recommended to enhance skills and knowledge.

B. Both career and non-career chief of mission candidates who are assigned to a multilateral mission should be required to take additional training in multilateral diplomacy and multilateral negotiations if they have no previous experience in a multilateral organization. This may require individual, customized training, but it is critical to effective representation of U.S. interests before an international body. Being unaware of the rules of engagement, formal or otherwise, that govern the practices and procedures of an international organization can leave a poor first impression and derail the achievement of a key U.S. objective.

ANNEX 1

United States Permanent Missions to International Organizations

U.S. Mission to the UN, New York, USUN (IO bureau)

U.S. Mission to UN Organizations in Vienna, UNVIE (IO bureau)

U.S. Mission to the Food and Agriculture Organizations, Rome (IO bureau)

U.S. Mission to the UN Environmental Program and U.S. Human Settlements Program, Nairobi, UNEP and UN-HABITAT (IO bureau)

U.S. Mission to UNESCO, Paris (IO bureau)*

U.S. Mission to UN and other International Organizations in Geneva (IO bureau)

U.S. Mission to the International Civil Aviation Organization, USICAO, Montreal (IO bureau)

U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, USNATO, Brussels (EUR bureau)

U.S. Mission to the European Union (USEU), Brussels (EUR bureau)

U.S. Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (USOECD), Paris (EB bureau)

U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The Hague (AVC bureau)

U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, (USOSCE) Vienna (EUR bureau)

U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States (USOAS) Washington, DC. (WHA bureau)

U.S. Mission to ASEAN, Jakarta (EAP bureau)

U.S. Mission to the African Union, Addis Ababa (AF bureau)

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* U.S. membership from UNESCO withdrawn January 2019

Note: While the U.S. has diplomatic missions to the European Union, ASEAN, and the African Union, it is not a member state of these organizations.

ANNEX 2

List of international organizations in which the United States officially participates*

Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada (USMCA)

Asian Development Bank (ADB) (nonregional member)

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (dialogue partner)

Australia Group

Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty (ANZUS)

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSEC) (observer)

Colombo Plan (CP)

Council of Europe (CE) (observer)

Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) (observer)

Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) (observer)

Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)

Group of Seven (G7)

Group of Ten (G10)

Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20)

Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)

International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)

International Energy Agency (IEA)

International Energy Forum (IEF)

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCS)

International Grains Council (IGC)

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* Wikipedia. 2021. "International organization membership of the United States." Last modified April 12, 2021. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_organization_membership_of_the_United_States.

International Hydrographic Organization (IHO)

International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO)

International Olympic Committee (IOC)

International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRM)

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (ITSO)

International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Organization of American States (OAS)

Pacific Community (SPC)

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (partner)

Paris Club

Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (observer)

Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) (observer)

United Nations (UN) - Membership in the UN includes participation in the UN's Six Principal Organs: the General Assembly, Secretariat, International Court of Justice, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and Trusteeship Council.

- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
- International Labour Organization (ILO)
- International Maritime Organization (IMO)
- International Monetary Fund (IMF)
- International Organization for Migration (IOM)
- International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
- Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

- Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO Preparatory Commission)
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC)
- United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)
- United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH)
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
- United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)
- Universal Postal Union (UPU)
- World Bank Group (WBG)
  - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
  - International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
  - International Development Association (IDA)
  - International Finance Corporation (IFC)
  - Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
- World Health Organization (WHO)[2]
- World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
- World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
- World Trade Organization (WTO)

World Customs Organization (WCO)

World Organization of the Scout Movement (WOSM)

World Veterans Federation (WVF)

Zangger Committee (ZC)

Notable Absences

International Criminal Court

Signed treaty, but did not ratify on December 31, 2000; withdrew signature on May 6, 2002

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

Withdrew on December 31, 2018, due to concerns about the organization having an anti-Israel bias

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